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Since 1983, this annual Article 2 has been prepared to provide a survey of
recent developments in the case law interpreting and applying the various state
versions of the Uniform Arbitration Act3. The purpose is to promote uniformity
in the interpretation of the U.A.A. by developing and explaining the underlying
principles and rationales courts have applied in recent cases.4
II. VALIDITY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
A. Validity
Courts strive to promote arbitration as evidenced by Southland Corp. v.
Keating,5 in which the Supreme Court voiced a preference for arbitration.
Indicative of this country's preference for arbitration, the UAA firmly provides
that "[a] written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a
provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter
arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 6 This
1. This project was written and prepared by Journal ofDispute Resolution Candidates under the
direction of Associate Editor in Chief Robert M. Bain and Note and Comment Editor Cynthia Bradley-
Bishop.
2. See Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1990 J. DisP. RESOL 471; Recent
Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1989 J. DisP. RESOL 237; Recent Developments: The
Uniform Arbitration Act, 1988 J. DisP. RESOL 247; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration
Act, 1987 Mo. J. DiSP. RESOL 177; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1986 Mo.
J. DISP. RESOL 169; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1985 MO. J. DISP. RESOL
173; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1984 Mo. J. DisP. RESOL 207; Recent
Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 48 Mo. L. REV. 137 (1983).
3. UNIF. ARBrrRATION AcT §§ 1-25,7 U.L.A. 4 (1978) [hereinafter U.A.A.]. Jurisdictions which
have adopted arbitration statutes patterned after the UAA are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming.
4. This Article surveys cases decided between September, 1989 and September, 1990.
5. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
6. U.A.A § 1.
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provision grants substantial deference to the validity of arbitration agreements.7
Accordingly, courts applying this language tend to find arbitration agreements
valid.
The common law requirement that contracts be supported by consideration
guided the Arizona Court of Appeals to find an arbitration provision invalid."
The court in Stevens/LeinwebberSullens, Inc. v. Holm Development & Manage-
ment, Inc.,9 decided whether the validity of an arbitration provision is to be
separately decided when there is no attack on the underlying contract. 10
This case concerned a construction contract with an addendum to the contract
which included an arbitration clause.1 The appellee maintained that the
arbitration provision is invalid because the addendum was not supported by
consideration.' 2 Appellant argued that the arbitration clause should be construed
within the entire contract's context. 3 When the whole contract is supported by
adequate consideration, this consideration is sufficient to support the arbitration
provision in the addendum. 4 However, the court ruled that appellant could not
"borrow" consideration from the principle contract to support the arbitration clause
in the addendum. 5
The court reasoned that under the separability doctrine, where an arbitration
clause is considered an independent and separate document apart from the
principle contract, the arbitration provision lacking independent consideration is
void. 6 The court explained that consideration was lacking because the appellant
did not do anything in consideration of the rights granted to it in the addendum.
7
In short, the court invoked the basic contract principle that lack of consideration
may invalidate an arbitration agreement.
In DiGiammatteo v. Olney,'8 a Texas court applied additional contract
principles. The court applied the contract principle of privity to determine the
existence of a valid and enforceable arbitration provision.' 9 In this case, the
Texas Court of Appeals decided whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
confirm an arbitration award between appellee and appellant on the grounds that
the appellant was not a party to the contract authorizing the arbitration.20
7. Id.
8. StevenslLeinwebberlSullens, Inc. v. Holm Dev. and Managemen4 Inc., 165 Ariz. 25, 30, 795
P.2d 1308, 1313 (1990).
9. 165 Ariz. 25, 795 P.2d 1308.
10. Id. at 25, 795 P.2d at 1309.
11. Id. at 26, 795 P.2d at 1309.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 25, 795 P.2d at 1308.
15. Id. at 30, 795 P.2d at 1313.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 794 S.W.2d 103 (rex. Ct. App. 1990).
19. Id. at 104.
20. Id.
[Vol. 1991, No. 2
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The critical facts in this case are that DiGiammatteo, on behalf of the
corporation DiGiammatteo & Associates, contracted with Olney to consult on an
architecture project. 21 The court reasoned that Olney, the party trying to enforce
the contract, must prove that privity existed between himself and DiGiammatteo
in their individual capacities.? Because Olney failed to produce any evidence
that DiGiammatteo did not sign in his representative capacity, and because
DiGiammatteo introduced a copy of the contract indicating that DiGiammatteo
signed in his representative capacity, the court ruled that the trial court erred when
it confirmed the arbitration award.23 The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court's judgment and remanded the cause for further proceedings.'
Because this country favors arbitration, arbitration clauses tend to be found
valid. However, as the noted cases have shown, a court will not hesitate to
declare an arbitration agreement invalid by using the same grounds used to
invalidate a contract.
B. Arbitrability
The question of arbitrability, whether a claim is to be arbitrated or decided
by a court, is clearly important to both parties to an agreement. 2 When
confronted with this question, courts generally hold that if there is a valid
arbitration agreement between the parties, their disputes or claims are arbitrable.2
Of course parties may keep certain claims out of arbitration, but unless the
language of the arbitration clause is clear as to what is excluded,27 courts often
find that disputes are within the scope of the clause and are thus arbitrable.?8
Such holdings are aligned with the pervasive policy favoring arbitration" which
leads courts to construe arbitration clauses as broadly as possible ° while
remaining true to the intent of the parties.3 1
21. Id. at 103.
22. Id. at 104.
23. Id. at 105.
24. Id.
25. See infra notes 32-136 and accompanying text.
26. Cell v. Moore & Scheley Secs., 449 N.W.2d 144, 147-48 (Minn. 1989).
27. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 3721 v. District of Columbia, 563 A.2d 361,362
(D.C. 1989).
28. Cell, 449 N.W.2d at 148.
29. Phillips v. Parker, 794 P.2d 716, 718 (Nev. 1990).
30. Local 3721, 563 A.2d at 362.
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1. Existence of Agreements
In Beard v. Mount Carroll Mutual Fire Insurance3 2 the court demonstrated
how completely it follows the broad policy favoring arbitration.33 The plaintiff
in Beard sued her insurance company for recovery under her insurance policy
covering the destruction of her rental house and its furnishings.' The insurance
policy contained an appraisal clause which required disinterested appraisers to
determine the value of the property in case of a disagreement between the
parties." This clause was to act as a condition precedent to filing suit.' The
court analogized the appraisal clause to an enforceable arbitration clause37 and
thus held it valid as "an agreement to submit a future controversy to an out of
court settlement."
3 8
Waiver on the part of the parties also leads to the enforceability of arbitration
clauses. In Joder Building Corp. v. Lewis, 39 the court held that the defendants'
participation in the arbitration proceeding was sufficient to waive their right to
object to the enforceability of the arbitration clause under the Vermont U.A.A. 40
Plaintiff, a construction contractor, entered into agreement with defendants,
homeowners, to work at defendants' home.41 When a dispute later arose, the
parties looked to a signed agreement concerning arbitration.42 The agreement did
not contain the acknowledgement language as required by Vermont's version of
the U.A.A.,43 but defendants participated in arbitration until the arbitrators
refused to give them a postponement; then they simply did not appear. '
32. 203 IIl. App. 3d 724, 561 N.E.2d 116 (1990).
33. See id at 727-31, 561 N.E.2d at 117-20.
34. Id. at 726, 561 N.E.2d at 117.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 726-27, 561 N.E.2d at 117.
37. Id. at 727-28, 561 N.E.2d at 118.
38. Id. at 728, 561 N.E.2d at 118.
39. 153 Vt. 115, 569 A.2d 471 (1989).
40. Id. at 120-22, 569 A.2d at 474.
41. Id. at 117, 569 A.2d at 471-72.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 119, 569 A.2d at 472-73. Vermont's version of the U.A.A provides:
Required provision. No agreement to arbitrate is enforceable unless accompanied by or
containing a written acknowledgement of arbitration signed by each of the parties or their
representatives. When contained in the same document as the agreement to arbitrate, that
acknowledgement shall be displayed prominently. The acknowledgement shall provide
substantially as follows:
"ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ARBITRATION.
I understand that (this agreement/my agreement with _ of .) contains an agreement to
arbitrate. After signing (this/that) document, I understand that I will not be able to bring a
lawsuit concerning any dispute that may arise which is covered by the arbitration agreement,
unless it involves a question of constitutional or civil rights. Instead, I agree to submit any such
dispute to an impartial arbitrator."
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5652(b) (1990).
44. Joder, 153 Vt. at 120, 569 A,2d at 472.
4
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Defendants first argued that the required acknowledgement was missing from their
arbitration agreement when they filed a motion with the court to dismiss the
confirmation of the award.45
The court in Joder found that the language of the clause did not substantially
embody the required acknowledgement nor was it prominently displayed as
required by the statute.' However, the court determined that the clause was
binding on the parties47 because a later section of the statute shows that a certain
amount of participation in an arbitration proceeding waives a party's right to
challenge the lack of an acknowledgement."
Since defendants stopped participating only when they were dissatisfied with
the arbitrators, they now may not attack the clause's noncompliance with the
statute simply because they were unhappy with the award. 49 The court concluded
that it would be improper to reward defendants' behavior in this matter and thus
held that defendants' participation in this arbitration prevented them from alleging
defects in the agreement."
The court in Graham v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurances' held
that even in the absence of statutory language endorsing a certain type of
arbitration clause, such a clause was not against public policy. 2 The Graham
court found that since such clauses are part of an enforceable contract they bind
the parties to arbitrate, waiving their right to a jury trial.3
In Graham, plaintiffs, whose car was insured by State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance, were in a car wreck caused by an unknown motorist.'
After the accident, the parties disagreed as to the amount defendant, the insurance
company, owed the plaintiffs53 Plaintiffs then filed suit, but the trial court
granted defendant's summary judgment since the insurance policy required
arbitration.5 6 Plaintiffs did not even see the policy until after their first payment
and were not made aware of the arbitration clause by the defendants."
s
The court stated that the public policy of Delaware favors arbitration." It
also noted that to avoid enforcement of the clause the plaintiffs must show either
that the clause has been revoked or that some other provision of law supersedes
45. Id. at 120, 569 A.2d at 47273.
46. Id. at 119, 569 A.2d at 473,
47. Id. at 119-20, 569 A.2d at 473-74.
48. !1& at 120, 569 A.2d at 473.
49. ld.
50. d. at 122, 569 A.2d at 474.
51. 565 A.2d 908 (Del. 1989).
52. Id. at 911.
53. ld. at 913.




58. Id. at 911.
1991]
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the Delaware version of the U.A.A. 9 The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that
absence of specific statutory language endorsing the inclusion of arbitration clauses
in insurance policies means such inclusion is against public policy.' On the
contrary, the court determined that this type of arbitration clause was fair to both
parties.61
The Graham court also held that although an insurance contract is a contract
of adhesion, inclusion of an arbitration clause waives the plaintiff's constitutional
right to a jury trial unless the contract is unconscionable and thus unenforce-
able.' The court determined that this contract was not unconscionable since both
parties had equal input in selecting the arbitrators, the result bound both parties,
and it adhered to the public policy of the state by resolving disputes through
arbitration.'
2. Scope of the Agreement
The determination of which issues an arbitration clause encompasses is an
area in which the courts clearly show a preference for arbitrability. Unless the
intent of the parties as reflected in the language of the clause, clearly excludes an
issue, courts generally find that issue arbitrable."
As discussed earlier, when the Beard court decided to treat the appraisal
clause in the insurance policy similar to an arbitration agreement, it included in
its analysis the general policy favoring arbitration." In this case the plaintiff's
loss entailed a total destruction of her property. 66 Since the terms of the
agreement were clear and there was nothing in them to suggest that the parties
meant to exclude disputes concerning total destruction of property from arbitration,
the court found against favoring arbitration. 7 Although total destruction would
make appraisal of the property more difficult, the court concluded that appraisal
was still possible since information as to the property's value could come from
other sources." Thus the court held that the appraisal clause did apply to this
issue and remanded the case with an order for the trial court to compel apprais-
a.69
al."
The court in Phillips v. Parker"0 displayed its favoritism toward arbitration




62. Id. at 912-13.
63. Id.
64. See infra notes 65-133 and accompanying text.
65. Beard, 203 111. App. 3d at 727-29, 561 N.E.2d at 118-19.
66. Id. at 728-29, 561 N.E.2d at 118-19.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 729, 561 N.E.2d at 119.
69. Id. at 730-31, 561 N.E.2d at 119-20.
70. 794 P.2d 716 (Nev. 1990).
[Vol. 1991, No. 2
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contract, they did relate to the agreement and were therefore within the scope of
the agreement's arbitration clause. 71 The parties in Phillips contracted to start
a mail service business.7 Their contract included an arbitration clause that
provided for arbitration of any controversy "relating to" the agreement. 3
The defendant later removed plaintiff from the corporation's board of
directors, and when plaintiff sued, defendant Phillips moved to compel arbitra-
tion. 4 In an attempt to avoid arbitration, plaintiff promptly amended his
complaint to omit any reference to the agreement.7 The court stated that there
is a "strong public policy" in favor of contractual arbitration agreements in Nevada
which plaintiff's amended pleading cannot evade since it is based on rights the
agreement allegedly conferred on him.76 The court concluded that those rights
relate to the agreement and therefore fall within the scope of the arbitration
clause."
Similarly in A.E. Staley Manufacturing v. Robertson,' the Illinois appellate
court broadly applied a generic arbitration agreement in one contract to issues
arising under another related agreement concerning the same subject matter.7 9
In A.E. Staley, defendant and plaintiff entered a "Management Retention
Agreement"' whereby defendant, an executive working for the plaintiff
corporation, received retirement benefits for remaining with the corporation
through a takeover."1 The parties later entered a second supplemental agreement
which gave defendant additional retirement benefits.8 2 The original agreement
contained a broad arbitration clause, while the supplement said nothing about
arbitration.83 After defendant's termination from the corporation, he received
what he alleged was partial payment of the retirement benefits due to him under
the supplement." Defendant sought to arbitrate the dispute under the clause
found in the original contract.85
Since it did not specify which issues were to be arbitrated, the appellate court
stated that the clause was a generic arbitration clause." The court held that the
dispute must arise out of the subject matter of the contract to be within the scope
71. Id. at 718.
72. 1d at 717.
73. Id.
74. 1
75. 1d. at 718.
76. Id
77. id.
78. 588 N.E.2d 434 (Il1. App. Ct. 1990).
79. 1& at 437-38.
80. Id. at 435.





86. Id. at 436-37.
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of that contract's generic clause.87 The court further held that since the subject
matter of the original contract and the supplement was the same, such as the
amount of the defendant's benefits upon retirement or termination, arbitration was
proper.U Rejecting the plaintiff's narrow characterization of the subject matter
of the agreements, the court held that the dispute was within the scope of the
arbitration clause in the original contract.89
In American Federation of Government Employees, Local 3721 v. District of
Columbia," the court determined that specific contractual rights of the defendant
were expressly excluded from the parties' agreement to arbitrate since there was
no other way to interpret the clause's language.91 Plaintiff, the American
Federation of Government Employees, Local 3721, sought to arbitrate a labor
dispute between one of its members and the District of Columbia Fire Depart-
ment.9 Plaintiff claimed the defendant wrongfully terminated its member.93
The trial court found that the issue of wrongful termination was not within the
scope of the arbitration clause since the agreement to arbitrate excluded this
particular issue.' Following a policy favoring arbitration, the court stated that
if the clause was "susceptible of an interpretation" embracing this issue, the issue
was arbitrable.95 The court then found that the clause specifically excluded
management rights, which included the right to discharge issues from arbitra-
tion." Therefore the court held that the clause in question was not susceptible
to an interpretation that included this issue within its scope.
97
Whether a flaw in the underlying contract. invalidates an arbitration clause
within the contract, or whether the existence of the flaw is itself an issue for
arbitration is an important question facing courts interpreting the Uniform
Arbitration Act. In Mewbourne Oil Co. v. Blackburn,9 the Texas Court of
Appeals held that an allegation of a party's repudiation of a contract was within
the scope of that contract's arbitration clause.99 The parties in Mewbourne
entered into many agreements, all containing arbitration clauses, for which
Mewbourne was to sell gas to defendant Transwestern Pipeline Company."'
Plaintiff Mewbourne later sued the defendant claiming it had breached and
87. Id. at 437.
88. Id
89. Id. at 437-38.
90. 563 A.2d 361.
91. Id. at 364.
92. Id. at 362.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. ld. at 362-63.
96. Id. at 363.
97. Id.
98. 793 S.W.2d 735 (rex. Q. App. 1990).
99. Id. at 737.
100. Id. at 736.
[Vol. 1991, No. 2
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repudiated the contracts."0 1 The court stated that since the agreement to arbitrate
was in writing, the dispute concerning the performance of the underlying contracts
is a question for the arbitrators and does not affect the validity of the arbitration
clause. '0
In Michael-Curry Cos. v. Knutson Shareholders Liquidating Trust,"°3 the
Minnesota Supreme Court faced a similar situation. The court held that a claim
that the underlying contract was fraudulently induced was within the scope of the
arbitration agreement." 4 The Knutson Shareholders trust contracted to sell stock
to the Michael-Curry companies." That contract contained an arbitration
clause."° Later, an amendment to the contract was executed which guaranteed
Michael-Curry a certain profit.1 0 7 When that profit was not realized, Michael-
Curry demanded reimbursement under the amendment." The trust then alleged
that Michael-Curry was guilty of fraud in the inducement of the amendment, and
therefore refused to submit to arbitration)°9
The court stated that it must determine whether the issue of fraud in the
inducement was within the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement by
discerning the parties' intent from the language of the clause.110 The court noted
that the clause's language, must either specifically include fraud in the inducement
or be broad enough to comprehend its inclusion.1 Although the court found
no specific reference to this issue, it found that the clause was broad enough to
require arbitration of a claim of fraud in the inducement.1 12 The clause stated
that it covered issues relating to "the making" of the contract which the court
found included circumstances surrounding the contract's formation, such as fraud
in the inducement. " 3 The court rejected the trust's contention that specificity
of the scope of issues to be arbitrated is always required, stating that such a rule
would be impractical and would defeat the policy favoring arbitration. " 4 The
court concluded by expressing its concern that allegations of fraud in the
inducement in the underlying contract are often made to avoid arbitration by
101. Id.
102. Id. at 737.
103. 449 N.W.2d 139.
104. Id. at 142.





110. d. at 141.
111. Id.
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rendering the contract's arbitration clause invalid.1 s The court emphasized that
requests to stay arbitration for this reason should be stated with particularity." 6
In Smith v. Logan,"7 the Arizona Court of Appeals held a claim of fraud
in the inducement of a contract to be within the scope of the contract's arbitration
clause, since the language of the clause itself was very broad.1 The parties
contracted for plaintiff Smith to buy a business from Logan. 9 The contract
contained an arbitration clause, but the trial court refused to compel arbitration of
Smith's claim of fraud in the inducement.120 The appellate court reversed
finding that the language of the agreement was broad enough to show the parties'
intent to have such issues arbitrated.12 1 In addition, the claim was not fraudulent
inducement of the arbitration agreement itself, but of the entire contract. 12 The
court concluded that the clause's language stating that "disputes relating to any of
the representations"'2 will be arbitrated, included Smith's claim of fraud,
especially since this interpretation was consistent with the other provisions of the
contract. 124
Finally in Cell v. Moore & Schley Securities Corp.2 the Supreme Court
of Minnesota applied New York law to determine that the issue of fraud in the
inducement was within the scope of the contract's arbitration clause' 1  The
plaintiff, Cell, sued his stockbrokers alleging they fraudulently induced him to
enter a "Customer's and Margin Agreement."1 27 That agreement contained an
arbitration clause.12 After finding that New York law governed the agreement,
the court noted that in that state an arbitration clause is separable from the
underlying contract. 29 Thus, even if the contract was induced by fraud the
arbitration agreement would still be valid.1 30 Since the plaintiff did not allege
fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause, the court found the clause
valid.1 31 The court determined that the language of the clause itself was broad
and therefore required the arbitration of all disputes reasonably related to the
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 166 Ariz. 1, 799 P.2d 1378 (Ct. App. 1990).
118. lit at 2-3, 799 P.2d at 1379-80.
119. Id. at 2, 799 P.2d at 1379.
120. Id. at 1, 799 P.2d at 1378.
121. Id. at 3, 799 P.2d at 1380.
122. Id. st 2-3, 799 P.2d at 1379-80.
123. Id. at 2, 799 P.2d at 1379.
124. Id. at 2-3, 799 P.2d at 1379-80.
125. 449 N.W.2d 144.
126. Id. at 149.
127. Id. at 145.
128. ld.
129. d. at 147.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 148.
[Vol. 1991, No. 2
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subject matter of the contract that are not specifically excluded by the clause.1 32
Since doubts under New York law are construed in favor of arbitration, and the
language of the agreement expressly encompassed conduct prior to the agreement,
such as fraudulent inducement, the court held that this dispute was within the
scope of the arbitration agreement."3
The court's final inquiry was whether fraud permeated the whole contract,
including the arbitration clause. 3 ' In such a case the court noted New York
courts might strike down an arbitration clause. 135 The court concluded, however,
that there was no evidence that the contract was not negotiated at arm's length or
that the arbitration clause was inserted into the contract to further a fraudulent
scheme.- 6
Overall, courts are very willing to find a valid arbitration clause and to
determine that most issues related to the underlying contract are within the clause.
This willingness effectuates the policy favoring arbitrability. There are no signs
of this policy weakening as courts continue to require a clear intent to exclude an
issue from arbitration before they will actually exclude it. This ever increasing
judicial acceptance of arbitration makes such clauses powerful and useful tools in
today's contracts.
C. Waiver
A party has a right to court enforcement of arbitral agreements upon a
showing that such an agreement exists.'37 However, arbitration agreements are
essentially contractual in nature.138 As with any contract, the right to enforce
the agreement may be waived when a party acts in a manner inconsistent with
their contractual rights.139 Parties desiring arbitration are often found to have
waived their right to do so when they have participated in litigation, not fulfilled
a condition precedent, failed to initiate arbitration, or when there has been undue
prejudice and delay in seeking arbitration. 4 When a court finds that a waiver
has occurred, it is as if the agreement to arbitrate never existed, and the party who
waived their right has no grounds for asking the court to compel arbitration. 41
132. Id.
133. Id. at 148-49.
134. Id. at 149.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 150.
137. U.A.A. § 2(a).
138. See generally 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 515(6) (1963).
139. Id. § 515(11).
140. Id.
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1. Participating in Litigation
Yates v. Doctor's Associates, Inc. 42 is an example of the general rule for
waiver of the right to arbitrate based on participating in litigation. Yates involved
a rather complicated dispute over franchising agreements. 43 Plaintiff Yates and
his partner filed a lawsuit against several defendants based on disagreements
concerning their contract with the defendants.4" Defendants responded with a
motion to compel arbitration under the terms of the contract.14 While the
motion was pending, several of the defendants filed forcible entry and detainer
actions to recoup claimed losses for non-payment of royalties under the same
contract.'"
The Illinois Court of Appeals held that defendants' actions constituted a
waiver of their right to compel arbitration. 47 The court based its decision on
the fact that "defendants were not content to rely on the arbitration process with
respect to their own claims against plaintiffs."'" Thus, the court held that the
defendants "must be regarded as having submitted arbitrable issues for judicial
determination." 49
In Costello v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.,'50 the Minnesota Court of
Appeals held that plaintiff waived his right to compel arbitration by initiating a
lawsuit.51 In Costello, plaintiff already had been awarded damages in an action
against the other driver for injuries sustained in an auto accident.52 Plaintiff
sought to force his own insurance company, Aetna, to arbitrate a claim against his
underinsured motorists policy. 53 The Costello court pointed out that a claim
which would be barred by res judicata in a court of law is not necessarily barred
from arbitration. 5 4 The court, however, distinguished Costello from a situation
in which a party defendant in an earlier action asks to arbitrate the claim with a
third party (i.e. the insurance company)."5 Such a claim may still be arbitrated
in some instances even if the underlying claim has already been decided against
the party seeking arbitration in a court of law. 56 In Costello, the party seeking
142. 193 Il. App. 3d. 431, 549 N.E.2d 1010.
143. Id. at 432-33, 549 N.E.2d at 1011-12.
144. Id. at 434, 549 N.E.2d at 1013.
145. Id. at 434-35, 549 N.E.2d at 1013.
146. Id. at 435, 549 N.E.2d at 1013.
147. Id. at 440, 549 N.E.2d at 1017.
148. Id. at 440, 549 N.E.2d at 1016.
149. Id.
150. 463 N.W.2d 911 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
151. 1. at 913.
152. ld. at 912
153. Id.
154. ld.
155. Id. at 913.
156. Id.
(Vol. 1991, No. 2
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arbitration initiated a previous lawsuit and received a verdict in his favor."5 7
This precluded him from arbitrating the same issue with his carrier.158
In Valley Construction v. Perry Host Management,5 9 a Kentucky appellate
court found that waiver of the right to compel arbitration does not occur when the
party seeking arbitration files a claim in a lawsuit while continuing to seek
arbitration. 60 In that case, a hotel developer (Perry Host) brought an action
against a contractor (Valley Construction) based on breach of contract after a
building sank and was condemned.1 6 The contractor asked the court to stay the
proceedings and compel arbitration according to the terms of the contract.
1 62
In the meantime, Star Bank, who had provided $4,000,000 in funding for the
project, brought a separate action to foreclose its construction mortgage. 63 The
contractor filed a cross-claim against the developer based on claims arising under
another promissory note. 1" The cross-claim was dismissed by the state court
which was hearing the foreclosure suit, so the contractor filed his claim in federal
court as a plaintiff. 65
While considering the breach of contract action, the trial court denied the
motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration because "for a while, I [the
trial judge] thought it might be a good idea to arbitrate it, [but] a judge always has
a right to change his mind, and I've changed mine, and we're going to liti-
gate."1" The contractor, of course appealed the denial of his motion and the
court was forced to consider whether he had waived his right to arbitrate by filing
a cross-claim and subsequent action against the developer. 67
The Valley court reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered the
proceedings stayed and arbitration compelled. 61 They ruled that the contractor's
actions were simply in the nature of defending his rights and that he had taken
every opportunity to demand arbitration. 69 Therefore he had preserved his right
to seek arbitration.1 70
Similarly, in Underwriting Members of Lloyd's of London v. United Home
Life Insurance,171 the defendant actively sought arbitration while participating
in the litigation. In Lloyd's, plaintiff, United Home Life Insurance, sought a
157. d
158. Id.
159. 796 S.W.2d 365 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).
160. Id. at 368.
161. Id. at 365.
162. ld.
163. Id. at 367.
164. Id.
165. Id at 368.
166. Id. at 367.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 368.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. 549 N.E.2d 67 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
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declaratory judgment and damages under a contract with its reinsurer, Lloyd's,
over obligations under a reinsurance agreement. 72 The trial court granted
United's motion to stay arbitration and proceed to litigation on grounds that the
claim for damages was not covered by the arbitration agreement. 73
On appeal, the court found that the damages claim did not invalidate the
agreement to arbitrate the underlying construction of the contract, the court then
went on to discuss United's claim that Lloyd's had waived its right to arbi-
trate.1 74  United argued that Lloyds' active participation in the lawsuit via
discovery proceedings constituted an implied waiver of its right to seek arbitra-
tion.'75 The court found that participating in discovery does not waive that
party's right to compel arbitration especially when the party continues to assert a
right to arbitrate and complies with discovery only under a court order.176
2. Failure to Fulfill Conditions Precedent
In Burgess v. Lewis & Clark City-County Board of Health,177 the Montana
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could not seek arbitration of his wrongful
discharge claim until he had completed a mandatory probation period as required
by his employment contract.7 In Burgess, the employee had been terminated
from his position and asserted a right to arbitrate based on the personnel manual
he had been issued. 79 The court held that the plaintiff was barred from seeking
arbitration because he had not completed the probationary period that was also
required by the manual.' s
3. Undue Prejudice or Delay
The right to arbitrate may also be waived when there is a finding of undue
prejudice or delay to the party not requesting arbitration." This principle was
applied in D.M. Ward Construction Co. v. Electric Corp.,18 2 when the party
seeking arbitration did not file its motion to compel until 10 months into the
proceedings.1 8 At this point discovery had been completed and a trial date
set.18 The Kansas Court of Appeals found that such actions constituted undue
172. Id. at 68.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 71.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. 244 Mont. 275, 796 P.2d 1079 (1990).
178. Id. at 278, 796 P.2d at 1081.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Sturm v. Schamens, 99 N.C. App. 207, 208, 392 S.E.2d 432, 433 (1990).
182. 803 P.2d 593 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990).
183. Id. at 595.
184. Id.
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delay and thus affirmed the trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration
even though the contract specifically called for arbitration.186 The decision cited
several cases on undue delay, but seemed to rely primarily on the prejudice to the
non-moving party, who had actively participated in discovery and trial prepara-
tion.
In Sturm v. Schamens,'s the North Carolina Court of Appeals ruled that
the defendant's participation and gathering of evidence in an earlier litigation was
not unduly prejudicial to the plaintiff when the defendant had taken a voluntary
dismissal in the earlier action.' In Sturm, an investor brought an action against
his broker alleging unauthorized trading in the investor's account.'89 When the
defendant broker sought an order compelling arbitration, the plaintiff investor
argued that there had been an implied waiver of the right to arbitrate.'" The
court stated the general rule that in order to show implied waiver, "the party




In applying that standard to the facts of the case, the court refused to find a
waiver due to the defendant's failure to request arbitration in earlier litigation in
which both parties had been involved. 92 The court proceeded under the
assumption that the previous suits never existed because they were voluntarily
dismissed. 93
4. Failure to Initiate Arbitration
Mountain Plains Constructors v. Torrez"' presented the issue of which
party bears the burden of initiating arbitration. In that case, a contractor sued to
foreclose a mechanic's lien.'" The owner, upon entering his appearance, moved
to dismiss until arbitration was complete.'96 The contractor, however, opposed
arbitration and pointed to language in the contract that required the party desiring
arbitration to notify the American Arbitration Association within a reasonable time
after the dispute arose.1 9  The trial court ordered the dispute to proceed to trial,
185. Id. at 599.
186. Id.
187. 99 N.C. App. 207, 392 S.E.2d 432.
188. Id. at 209, 392 S.E.2d at 433.
189. Id. at 207, 392 S.E.2d at 432.
190. Id at 208, 392 S.E.2d at 433.
191. Id. (citing Servomation Corp. v. Hickory Constr. Co., 316 N.C. 543, 544, 342 S.E.2d 853,
854 (1986))..
192. Id at 209, 392 S.E.2d at 433.
193. Id
194. 785 P.2d 928 (Colo. 1990).
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finding that the owner had not fulfilled the terms of the contract. 98 The
Supreme Court of Colorado reversed that portion of the decision.'" The
Supreme Court held that the owner did not have the burden to initiate arbitration
since he was not the party asserting a claim under the contract.20 Therefore,
since the owner did not have the burden of initiating arbitration, he did not have
the obligation to notify the Arbitration Association as a condition precedent to
seeking arbitration30 '
III. PROCEEDINGS TO COMPEL OR STAY ARBITRATION
Once the court finds that an agreement to arbitrate exists, the U.A.A. requires
the court to compel arbitration 2 2 without giving any consideration to the merits
of the claim.203 On the other hand, if the court finds that there is no agreement
to arbitrate, it may stay the arbitration proceeding.2' The U.A.A. also provides
that stays of arbitration may be granted with respect to certain issues if those
issues are severable from the arbitrable dispute. 5 The issue of whether an
agreement to arbitrate exists is to be tried summarily by the court.3 When
faced with a motion to stay or compel arbitration, courts must also decide whether
the current controversy is within the scope of the agreement by resorting to
general contract principles.
A. The Threshold Requirements
In Minnesota, the Supreme Court has set forth certain guidelines to determine
whether arbitration is to be compelled:
(1) If the parties evinced a clear intent to arbitrate a controversy
arising out of specific provisions of the contract, the matter is for
arbitrators to determine and not the court.
(2) If the intention of the parties is reasonably debatable as to the
scope of the arbitration clause, the issue of arbitrability is to be initially
determined by the arbitrators subject to the rights of either party
reserved under [the Minnesota U.A.A.].
(3) If no agreement to arbitrate exists, either in fact or because the
controversy sought to be arbitrated is not within the scope of the
198. Id.
199. Id. at 931.
200. Id. at 930.
201. id.
202. UAA. § 2(a).
203. Id. § 2(e).
204. 14 § 2(b).
205. Id. § 2(d).
206. Id. § 2(a).
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arbitration clause of the contract, the court may interfere and protect a
party from being compelled to arbitrate. 7
In School Service Employees Union Local No. 284 v. Independent School
District No. 86,'°8 the Minnesota Court of Appeals used these guidelines to
determine whether a disagreement over the subcontracting out of a food service
operation was within the scope of the arbitration clause in the collective bargaining
agreement.' °  The collective bargaining agreement defined an arbitrable
grievance as "an employee allegation, disputed by the employer, relating to the
interpretation or application of terms and conditions of employment insofar as such
matters are contained in this agreement."2 0 The Minnesota Court of Appeals
began its analysis with "the proposition that arbitration to resolve disputes over
terms and conditions of employment is favored in Minnesota." 21 The court then
added that "arbitrability of an issue is determined in the first instance by an
arbitrator if it is reasonably debatable that the issue is covered under the arbitration
clause in question."
212
Given this relatively easy standard to satisfy, the court found that the
subcontracting out of the food service operation was "unequivocally a termination
of the employees and not of the jobs," and therefore a "reasonably debatable" issue
covered under the arbitration clause in question.213 Thus the court granted the
union's motion to compel arbitration.21 4
In Local No. 1119 American Federation State, County, and Municipal
Employees v. Mesabi Regional Medical Center,215 the Minnesota Court of
Appeals again used the "reasonably debatable" standard set forth inAtcas v. Credit
Clearing Corp.2"6 The dispute in Local No. 1119 centered around a class action
grievance filed by Local 1119 regarding the way in which the Medical Center was
assigning full-time and part-time positions.217 The union especially contested the
Medical Center's practice of breaking up full-time positions and converting them
into part-time positions with casual employees in avoidance of the collective
bargaining agreement.218
207. School Serv. Employees Union Local No. 284 v. Independent School Dist. No. 88, 459
N.W.2d 336, 338 (Minn. C. App. 1990) (quoting Atcas v. Credit Clearing Corp., 292 Minn. 334, 341,
197 N.W.2d 448, 452 (1972)).
208. 459 N.W.2d 336.




213. Id. at 339.
214. Id.
215. 463 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
216. 292 Minn. at 341, 197 N.W.2d at 452.
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The trial court found that the "language of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement clearly precludes from arbitration or negotiation the matter of the
number of full or part time positions created by the Medical Center."
219
Applying the Atcas guidelines, the court of appeals overruled the trial court by
finding that the grievance was well within the "broad scope of the arbitration
clause contained in the collective bargaining agreement." 220 The court found that
the conflicting positions held by the union and the Medical Center regarding the
utilization of casual employees were "a good indication that, at least for the
purpose of determining arbitrability, the language of the collective bargaining
agreement does not clearly express the intention of the parties."" The court
then stated that "[s]ince the union and the Medical Center disagree about the scope
of the arbitration clause and whether the grievance is subject to arbitration under
it, the intention of the parties to arbitrate the dispute is at least reasonably
debatable."' Therefore, the court concluded that "under Atcas the issue of
arbitrability must be determined by the arbitrator and not by the court as was done
here. =3
B. Scope of Court Findings
Along with Local No. 1119, the court of appeals also decided Local No. 791
American Federation State, County, and Municipal Employees v. City of
Hibbing.' The controversy in Local No. 791 concerned the hiring of non-union
temporary truck drivers by the City of Hibbing and the refusal of the city to let
equipment operator employees "bump" these temporary employees from the truck
driving positions.' The trial court found that these practices by the City of
Hibbing did not violate the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement and
specifically found that the hiring of the temporary employees was within the
exclusive management rights provision.226
Applying the standards set forth in Atcas, the court of appeals overruled the
trial court by holding that "a trial court is not allowed to make factual findings
when a motion to compel arbitration is brought before it."22 7 The appeals court
found that the conclusions of the trial court were based upon factual findings.
228
The court held that "[i]n judicial proceedings to stay or compel arbitration, the





224. 463 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
225. Id. at 293.
226. ld. at 296.
227. id.
228. 1d.
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limited issue presented is the existence and scope of the arbitration agree-
ment."2 9 In addition, the court found support in the Minnesota U.A.A. which
specifically provides that "[a]n order for arbitration shall not be refused on the
ground that the claim in issue lacks merit or bona fides or because any fault or
grounds for the claim sought to be arbitrated have not been shown."2"
In Crown Oil and Wax Co. v. Glen Construction Co.,"3 the Maryland
Court of Appeals reiterated the Minnesota Court's holding that the trial court is
prohibited from inquiring into the merits of the claim. 232 The controversy arose
out of a contract between Crown Oil and Glen Construction to construct a Quality
Inn under a franchise agreement.233  Crown Oil, however, transferred the
franchise agreement to Frederick Inn Limited Partnership (FHLP).' On
October 29, 1985, Crown Oil gave notice to Glen that they were terminating the
construction contract. 23s In November 1985, Glen demanded arbitration with
Crown Oil under their contract.236
In June 1987, Crown Oil filed an amended answer and counterclaim in
arbitration "on its own behalf, and on behalf of FHLP."237 On August 11, 1987,
Glen filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Frederick County naming Crown Oil
and FHLP as defendants and seeking to restrain Crown Oil and FHLP from
pursuing in arbitration "any claim by or on behalf of FHLP." 3
Glen acknowledged that it agreed to arbitrate with Crown Oil but its position
was that FHLP was not a party to the construction contract, that Glen has not
agreed to arbitrate with FHLP claims by FHLP, and that Glen has not agreed to
arbitrate claims on behalf of FHLP asserted by Crown Oil.239
The circuit court found that FHLP was not a third party beneficiary of the
construction contract-the fact that FHLP was not named in the contract as "most
significant," and the fact only Crown Oil had counterclaimed for damages in the
arbitration as "particularly significant."240 Therefore the court enjoined Crown
Oil and FHLP "from pursuing against Glen... in any arbitration proceeding, any
claim by or on behalf of FHLP."
241
In interpreting the Maryland U.A.A., the court of appeals found that where
the parties use broad, all encompassing clauses, it is presumed they intended all
229. Id. (quoting United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Fruchtman, 263 N.W.2d 66, 71 (Minn.
1978)).
230. MINN. STAT. § 572.09(e) (1988).
231. 320 Md. 546, 578 A.2d 1184 (1990).
232. Id. at 557-58, 578 A.2d at 1189.
233. Id. at 550, 578 A.2d at 1186.
234. Id.
235. Id at 553, 578 A.2d at 1187.
236. Id.
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matters to be arbitrated.2 4 2 But in determining the scope of these matters, the
court relied on their previous decision in Gold Coast Mall v. Larmar Corp.
243
in which they held: "[i]n accord with this legislative policy [favoring enforcement
of arbitration agreements], the Act strictly confines the function of the court in
suits to compel [or stay] arbitration to the resolution of a single issue-is there an
agreement to arbitrate the subject matter of a particular dispute."'"
Also in Gold Coast, Judge Davidson writing for the court of appeals,
classified disputes over the scope of an arbitration clause into three types.245
The first type is "where the language of the arbitration clause is clear, and the
dispute in question falls clearly within the provision."246 The second kind is
"where it is clear that the issue sought to be arbitrated lies beyond the scope of the
arbitration clause." 247 In both of these situations the court decides the issue of
arbitrability and compels or stays arbitration accordingly. 2" The third type is
where the language is unclear as to "whether the subject matter of the dispute falls
within the scope of the arbitration agreement."' It is in this third class of
disputes that "the Court should promote the legislative policy favoring arbitration
and leave the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrators."1 0 The dispute addressed
in Crown Oil was of this third kind.25'
The court in Crown Oil held that Crown Oil "at least equitably assigned its
benefits under the construction contract to FHLP and FHLP assumed the
obligations of Crown Oil under the contract" and thus had the right to compel
arbitration of the dispute with the contractor. 252  The court relied on the
reasoning of Ruberoid Co. v. Glassman Construction Co.," 3 which states that
"any words or transaction(s) which show an intention on one side to assign, and
on the other to receive ... will operate as an effective equitable assignment.
Therefore, the court found that if the language of the "lease is not an express
assumption by FHLP of Crown Oil's obligations as owner under the construction
contract, the entire transaction compels the finding that there was an implied
assumption."" 5
242. Id. at 558, 578 A.2d at 1189.
243. 298 Md. 96, 468 A.2d 91 (1983).







251. See Crown Oil, 320 Md. at 557-60, 578 A.2d at 1189-90.
252. Id. at 564, 578 A.2d at 1192.
253. 248 Md. 97, 234 A.2d 875 (1967); see Crown Oi, 320 Md. at 564, 578 A.2d at 1192.
254. Rubberoid Co., 248 Md. at 103, 234 A.2d at 878.
255. Crown Oil, 320 Md. at 565, 578 A.2d at 1192-93.
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In Slutsky-Peltz Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Vincennes Community School
Corp.," the Indiana Court of Appeals was forced to interpret the Indiana
UAA. in a controversy between a contractor and a corporation created for the
purpose of financing construction of a school building." 7 The dispute arose out
of coordination and delay problems on behalf of Slutsky-Peltz. 58 The electrical
contractor, one of the three contractors working on the construction project,
exercised its right under the prime contract to demand arbitration.2 59 In response
to the electrical contractor's demand for arbitration, the corporation filed a motion
requesting joinder of Slutsky-Peltz and Traylor Bros., the project coordinator, as
third party defendants in the electrical contractor's arbitration.m As a result,
Slutsky-Peltz filed a separate demand for arbitration against the corporation."
After the arbitrators held a pre-arbitration hearing in which they determined
that Slutsky-Peltz and Traylor Bros. could not be joined in the electrical
contractor's arbitration, the arbitrators gave the corporation time in which to obtain
a court order compelling Slutsky-Peltz and Traylor Bros. to participate in the
electrical contractor's arbitration. 62 The corporation then promptly filed an
application to compel arbitration in which it requested joinder of the two
contractors and subsequently amended its application to request a stay of the
Slutsky-Peltz arbitration pending decision of the joinder and consolidation issues
arising from the electrical contractor's arbitration. 2
3
The trial court entered extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law
determining that the corporation was entitled to summary judgment and therefore
ordered a stay of the Slutsky-Peltz arbitration and joinder of the two contractors
in the electrical contractor's arbitration. 2 4 Slutsky-Peltz then appealed on the
sole issue of whether consolidation and joinder of all the contractors into one
arbitration proceeding was proper under the terms of the prime contracts and under
Indiana Law.'
In applying the Indiana U.A.A., the Indiana Court of Appeals found that the
contract which existed provided for arbitration.' The court then addressed the
question of whether the arbitration provision in the contract amounied to an
agreement by Slutsky-Peltz and Traylor Bros. to submit to arbitration through
consolidation and joinder.2 7 In applying the rule that a trial court may not
extend arbitration agreements by construction or implication, the court of appeals
256. 556 N.E.2d 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
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held that the trial court may "determine the issues and the parties subject to
arbitration pursuant to the plain meaning of the agreement."' As a result, the
court found that the arbitration provisions in the prime contract were unambiguous,
substantially involved in the legal and factual questions raised by the electrical
contractor's arbitration, necessary to accord complete relief in that proceeding, and
therefore the trial court properly ordered them to participate in the electrical
contractor's arbitration. 69
C. Severability
Section 2(d) of the U.A.A. expressly permits the severing of issues into
arbitral and non-arbitral categories.270 If the issues are separate and distinct, the
fact that one issue in a dispute is not arbitrable or exceeds the scope of the
arbitration agreement does not negate the arbitration process for the rest of the
dispute. 271
In Lawrence Street Partners Ltd. v. Lawrence Street Venturers,272 a general
partner brought an action against other general partners of a joint venture seeking
a declaratory judgment. The request for declaratory judgment required that the
other general partners fund capital contributions, and asserted claims of breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, rescission, promissory
estoppel, and breach of good faith dealing.273 The other partners moved that a
valid arbitration agreement required the issues be submitted to arbitration.274
The Colorado Court of Appeals held that while the claims of breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, rescission, promissory
estoppel, and breach of good faith dealing were all subject to arbitration, the issue
of capital contributions was not.275 The Court found that the capital contribution
claims were expressly excluded from arbitration in the arbitration agreement.276
However, the mere fact that one claim among many is not arbitrable does not
foreclose arbitration: "[t]o the extent [the] claims were distinctly separate and
severable from capital contribution claims... " the claims are arbitrable.
27 7
Sometimes, just determining whether an arbitration agreement was meant to
cover a particular dispute presents problems. In Columbia Heights Teachers v.
School District 13,278 the Minnesota Court of Appeals offered the following
268. Id.
269. Id. at 347.
270. U.A.A. § 2(d).
271. See Lawrence Partners Ltd. v. Lawrence St. Venturers, 786 P.2d 508, 511 (Coo. Ct. App.
1989).
272. 786 P.2d 508.
273. Id. at 509.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 511.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. 457 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
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analysis in determining what an arbitration agreement covers: "[i]n determining
whether an arbitration agreement was meant to cover a particular dispute, we look
to the language of the agreement."2 9 The simple analysis taken by the court
rendered the deceivingly simple result of only those things mentioned in the
agreement being covered by arbitration.' This approach was very different
from that taken by the court in Lawrence.
The Lawrence court simply took a practical and common sense approach in
interpreting an arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement was clear as to
what was arbitrable and what was not.2s' And that which was arbitrable was
subject to severance and therefore immune from litigation.' The rigid approach
of the Columbia Heights court virtually disregards the utility of Section 2(d).'
IV. APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATORS BY COURT
Where an otherwise valid arbitration agreement is involved, Section 3 of the
UA.A. espouses the proposition that absent a method for appointing an arbitrator
or where that method has been frustrated for any reason, the court "on application
of a party shall appoint one or more arbitrators."' There appears to be little
hesitation on the part of courts to appoint arbitrators where the dominant intent of
the parties to arbitrate is clear; even when the specific provisions of the arbitration
agreement, dealing with the appointment of an arbitrators, cannot be fulfilled. s
In Moore, Costello & Hart v. Albrect,' the Minnesota Court of Appeals
compelled arbitration where the arbitration agreement specifically named the
arbitrator to be used, but did not provide for an alternative arbitrator in cases
where the original arbitrator was unable to fulfill his responsibility. 2 7  The
Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's holding that the parties had
"agreed to arbitrate, if at all, only before [the original arbitrator]."' The court
held that the dominant intent of the parties was to arbitrate and that pursuant to
Minnesota Statute 572.10 (U.A.A. § 3) arbitration was required:289
279. Id. at 777.
280. Id.
281. Lawrence, 786 P.2d at 510.
282. Id.
283. See Columbia Heights, 457 N.W. at 777.
284. UAA. § 3.
285. See Moore, Costello & Hart v. Albrect, No. C4-90-1086, slip op. at 2-3 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct.
30, 1990) (WESTLAW, MN-CS database). This unpublished opinion is not considered precedential
by the Minnesota Court of Appeals, but is included in this survey due to the insight it lends to the
understanding of the appointment of arbitrators under the U.A.A. See MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 480A.08(3)
(1990).
286. No. C4-90-1086 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 1990).
287. Id. at 1.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 3.
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If the arbitration agreement provides a method of appointment of arbitrators,
this method shall be followed. In the absence thereof, or if the agreed
method fails or for any reason cannot be followed, or when an arbitrator
appointed fails or is unable to act and his successor has not been duly
appointed, the court on application of a party shall appoint one or more
arbitrators .... 290
Both parties applied to the trial court for appointment of arbitrators!"
However, the number of arbitrators was a divisive issue.' g  The defendant,
Albrect, wanted a single arbitrator consistent with the arbitration agreement in
question,"3 while Moore, Costello, and Hart desired a three-member panel
pursuant to an earlier agreement. 294 The Court, however, did not hesitate to find
that the dominant intent of the parties was to arbitrate and that the arbitration
agreement naming a specific arbitrator who was unable to arbitrate, did not
frustrate the intent to arbitrate. 2  Therefore, the Court remanded the case for
appointment of a single arbitrator.2
V. CONFIRMATION AND VACATION OF AWARDS
Although arbitration provides an alternative to judicial resolution of disputes,
the court still may play a limited role. Upon application of a party, the court,
pursuant to Section 11 of the U.A.A., 29 may confirm the arbitration award,
unless a party moves pursuant to Section 12 of the U.A.A.2 to have the award
290. MINN. STAT. § 572.10 (1988).





296. Id at 3.
297. Section 11 of the UAA. on the confirmation of awards states: "Upon application of a party,
the Court shall confirm an award, unless within the time limits hereinafter imposed grounds are urged
for vacating or modifying or correcting the award, in which case the court shall proceed as provided
in Sections 12 and 13." U.A.A. § 11.
298. Section 12 of the UAA. concerns vacating an award and provides:
(a) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where:
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or
corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party;
(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause
being shown therefore or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise
so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of Section 5, as to prejudice
substantially the rights of a party; or
(5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely
determined in proceedings under Section 2 and the party did not participate in the
arbilration hearing without raising the objection;
24
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vacated. Such judicial review of the arbitration decision ensures the integrity of
the arbitration process as an effective means of resolving disputes.
A. Arbitrator Misconduct, Partiality, and Bias
In Hough v. Oswald,2' the Illinois Court of Appeals held that an arbitrator
who acts within her granted authority and whose decision is absent partiality or
misconduct, decides an award which is not reviewable.00 In Hough, a partner
in a law firm, Hough, alleged that an award resulting from arbitration was
invalid.3' Hough argued that his former partner, Oswald, had procured the
award through fraud and thus the award should be vacated." 2 Hough, however,
alleged no misconduct on the part of the arbitrator.303 The court reasoned that
the only relevant question is whether the arbitrator committed fraud or wrongdo-
ing.3" Absent such wrongdoing, fraud or "mistake appearing on the face" of the
award, the award is valid.' Thus, an allegation that one of the parties to an
arbitration committed fraud to procure an award is not grounds for vacating.'
but the fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court
of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award.
(b) An application under this Section shall be made within ninety days after
delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant, except that, if predicated upon
corruption, fraud or other undue means, it shall be made within ninety days after such
grounds are known or should have been known.
(c) In vacating the award on grounds other than stated in clause (5) of Subsection
(a) the court may order a rehearing before new arbitrators chosen as provided in the
agreement, or in the absence thereof, by the court in accordance with Section 3, or if the
award is vacated on grounds set forth in clauses (3) and (4) of Subsection (a) the court
may order a rehearing before the agreement requires the award to be made is applicable
to the rehearing and commences from the date of the order.
(d) If the application to vacate is denied and no motion to modify or correct the
award is pending, the court shall confirm the award.
U.A.A § 12.
299. 556 N.E.2d 765 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
300. Id. at 766.
301. Id.
302. d.
303. Id. at 767.
304. Id.
305. Jd.
306. d.; see also Integrated Resources Equity Corp. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 799 P.2d 295,
298 (Alaska 1990) (the court held "an arbitration award shall be vacated if an arbitrator has been guilty
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B. The Arbitrator's Scope of Authority
In Mandich v. North Star Partnership,307 Mandich was a party to a two-
year contract with North Star Partnership.3 ' The contract provided for arbitra-
tion of any disputes and further stated that, "this agreement contains the entire
agreement between the Parties and there are no oral or written inducements,
promises, or agreements, except as provided herein. ''3r Mandich's agent agreed
orally with the agent for North Star that if Mandich retired and collected under a
disability insurance policy that North Star would not then be obligated to pay his
salary under the contract. °
The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the arbitrator did not exceed his
authority by recognizing the validity of the oral agreement.311 The court relied
on the general proposition that "[i]f the arbitrator's decision is challenged on the
merits, the decision must be upheld if the award draws its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement. 31 2  In addition, an award "does draw its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement so long as the interpretation can
in some rational manner be derived from the agreement, viewed in the light of its
language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties' intention." A
reviewing court may only vacate the award where there is "manifest disregard of
the agreement, totally unsupported by principles of contract construction and the
law of the shop."3
1 4
307. 450 N.W.2d 173 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
308. Id. at 174.
309. Id. at 175.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 177.
312. Id. at 176; see County of Hennepin v. Hennepin County Ass'n of Paramedics and
Emergency Medical Technicians, 464 N.W.2d 578,580 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the award
must draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement).
313. Mandich, 450 N.W.2d at 176 (quoting Ramsey County v. Local 8, 309 N.W.2d 785, 790
(Minn. 1981)); see In re Robinson/Keir Partnership, 573 A.2d 1188, 1191 (Vt. 1990) (holding that the
original arbitration agreement granted authority but this authority is not fixed by the only agreement).
If the parties submit a written demand for an arbitration then the arbitrator has the authority necessary
to resolve the demands. Id. at 1191-92.
314. Mandich, 450 N.W.2d at 176. But see Rauh v. Rockford Prods. Corp., 281 Ill. App. 3d 361,
363, 559 N.E.2d 73, 75 (1990). The court agreed that an arbitrator exceeds his authority by deciding
issues not submitted by the parties. Id at 365, 559 N.E.2d at 75. The court in Rauh, gave a narrow
interpretation to the issues submitted by the parties. The court found that because neither party
mentioned in their written demands for arbitration the correct clause in the original contract, to fire the
Chief Executive Officer of the corporation; the arbitrator had exceeded her authority by relying on such
clause in terminating the officer. Id. at 366-67, 559 N.E.2d at 76-77. The decision by the court is
narrow because the parties clearly desired the arbitrator to resolve the broad issue of termination yet
the court relied on the technical point of failing to specify the correct clause. The court could have
let the arbitration award stand on the grounds that the parties' written demands presented the issue for
termination or resolution; and therefore, the arbitrator had as her authority to resolve the termination
issue the original agreement regardless of the errors in the written demands to specify the correct clause
within such agreement.
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The court, recognizing the extent of the arbitrator's powers, concluded that
the arbitrator may consider aspects of the parties' relationship that a court would
otherwise not be allowed to recognize." 5 Hence, the arbitrator did not exceed
his powers by looking to the oral agreement as the more "persuasive indicia of the
parties' intent."
316
In Pennsylvania, once it is determined that the agreement encompasses the
subject matter of the dispute, review of arbitrator's findings with regard to a
collective bargaining agreement is limited to whether the decision draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement.31 7 Accordingly, the court in
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Local v. Borough
of State CollegeY' concluded that notwithstanding "irregularities" during the
investigation process, the arbitrator's award will not be reversed or vacated where
full and complete hearings were conducted, witnesses were offered, permitted to
testify, and subject to cross examination, and all evidence and arguments were
considered by the arbitrator. 1 9 Since the arbitrator's award was based on a
reasonable interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and standards of
conduct developed by the department pursuant to the collective bargaining
agreement, the award draws its essence from the agreement, and thus, shall not be
reversed or vacated.3
20
In David Co. v. Jim W. Miller Construction, Inc.,321 Miller contracted with
David Co. to construct townhouses. 322 Disputes arose concerning claims of
defective workmanship. 3' The arbitrators, taking a somewhat novel approach,
ordered the general contractor, Miller, to purchase the real property on which the
townhouses had been erected.3 u Miller contended that the arbitrators, in
fashioning such equitable relief, exceeded their authority.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, based on the general tradition of favoring the
use of arbitration in dispute resolution, recognized that while parties may by
contract or written submission limit the arbitrators' authority, absent such
limitation, the arbitrators are the final judges of both the facts and the law
concerning the merits.3 26 The court concluded that, in light of the extremely
broad arbitration clause in the contract, the arbitrators did not exceed their
315. Mandich, 450 N.W.2d at 176.
316. id
317. See Neshaminy Fed'n of Teachers v. Neshaminy School Dist., 501 Pa. 534,539-54,462 A.2d
629, 632 (1983).
318. 578 A.2d 48 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).
319. Id. at 52.
320. Id. at 53.
321. 444 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1989).
322. Id. at 837.
323. d at 837-38.
324. Id. at 838.
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authority in fashioning such equitable relieL 327 In addition, the fact that the
arbitrators were able to make an alternative monetary award has no relevance to
the determination of the scope of powers delegated to them.3"
With regard to the award of punitive damages, the court in Complete v.
Behan3 "2 concluded that where the parties' agreement did not provide for award
of punitive damages, the award of such damages exceeded the arbitrator's
authority."3 Whereas, some courts hold that broad arbitration clauses show
intent to give arbitrators broad powers to decide any claim, including the
allowance of punitive damages, 331 the court in Complete reasoned that punitive
damages may not be awarded absent express authorization in the agreement or
pursuant to a stipulated submission.332
In Granger Northern, Inc., v. Cianchete,333 the Maine Supreme Court
established an even broader spectrum in which arbitrators may interpret contracts.
In order for the arbitrator to exceed her authority "fair and reasonable minds" must
agree that the interpretation given the agreement by the arbitrator is impossible if
fairly construed.31 In Granger, the arbitration agreement contained an "all
disputes" clause which refers all disputes arising from the parties' original contract
to arbitration.35 The defendant, Cianchette, argued that a dispute over "change
orders" did not lie within the original contract with Granger Northern, Inc., and
therefore, the arbitrator exceeded his authority by issuing an award effecting such
orders.3 6
The court determined that absent an express exclusion of the change orders
from the "all disputes" arbitration agreement, the orders were well within the
arbitrator's scope of authority."37 The court relied on Acevedo Maldonaldo v.
PPG Industries,338 which held "contract-generated or contract-related dis-
327. Id. at 840-42.
328. Id. at 842.
329. 558 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. -t. App. 1990).
330. l at 51.
331. See Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1387-88 (11th Cir. 1988);
Willoughby Roofing & Supply v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353, 357-59 (N.D. Ala. 1984), affd,
776 F.2d 269 (1lth Cir. 1985); Ehrich v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 559, 563-65
(D.S.D. 1987).
332. Complete, 558 So. 2d at 51.
333. 572 A.2d 136 (Me. 1990).
334. Id. at 137; see Kilianek v. Kim, 192 Ii. App. 3d. 139, 140, 548 N.E.2d 598, 599 (1989)
(holding that in contract interpretation an arbitrator will not exceed her authority unless 'all fair and
reasonable minds would agree that the construction of the contract made by the arbitrator was not
possible under a fair inlerpmtation thereo!).
335. Granger, 572 A.2d at 138-39.
336. Id. at 137-38 (citing the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 9, which defines a change order
as "a written order to the Contractor signed by the Owner or his authorized agent and issued after the
execution of this Agreement, authorizing a Change in the Guaranteed Maximum Price .... ).
337. Id. at 139.
338. 514 F.2d 614 (1st Cir. 1975),
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putes"339 fall within the arbitration agreement because the parties specified an
"all disputes" clause in the arbitration clause.3-" For a dispute to be nonarbi-
trable it must be so unrelated that any fair interpretation of the arbitration
agreement could not possibly cover the dispute. 341
C. Errors of Fact and Law
In the absence of fraud or misconduct, courts will generally not vacate an
arbitration award that contains errors of fact or law.3" In C Ltd. v. Creative
Microsystems, Inc.,3" the court quoted the Kansas Supreme court which held:
"[w]here parties have agreed to be bound by a submission to arbitration, errors of
law and fact, or an erroneous decision of matters submitted to the judgment of the
arbitrators, are insufficient to invalidate an award fairly and honestly made."
3
"
In C Ltd., a computer software company, C Ltd., contended that Creative
Microsystems, Inc. breached an exclusivity agreement in a contract regarding a
certain piece of software. 34s An arbitrator concluded that C Limited suffered no
damages.' " C Ltd. appealed, arguing that the arbitrator had made an error in
not awarding damages and that the error was of such magnitude that the awards
should be vacated.3
The court affirmed the arbitration award citing the Kansas Supreme Court
which stated: "it is not the function of the court to hear the case de novo and
consider the evidence presented to the arbitrators."30 The court recognized that
"[a] mistake or error of fact of law which is so gross and palpable as to be
evidence of misconduct or undue partiality may, however, be a ground of
impeachment, as may a misconstruction of the law which is so perverse as to work
manifest injustice."34 However, the court found that award to be valid because
the evidence did not support C Ltd.'s contention that the award constituted
manifest injustice.3" Of course, a court has discretion in deciding whether a
339. Id. at 616.
340. Granger, 572 A.2d at 139.
341. Id.
342. See Batten v. Howell, 389 S.E.2d 170, 171-72 ( S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
343. No. 62984 (Kan. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 1989)(WESTLAW, KS-CS data base). This unpublished
opinion is not considered precedential by the Kansas Court of Appeals, but is included in this survey
to aid the understanding of the U.A.A. See KAN. Sup. Cr. R. 7.04.
344. Id. at 6 (quoting Coleman v. Local No. 570, 181 Kan. 969, 980-81, 317 P.2d 831, 841
(1957). The Kansas Supreme Court stated "Nothing in the award relative to the merits of the
controversy as submitted, even though incorrectly decided, is ground for setting aside an award in the
absence of fraud, misconduct or other valid objections.").
345. Id. at 3.
346. Id. at 4.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 5 (quoting Jackson Trak Group, Inc. v. Midstates Port Auth., 242 Kan. 683, 689, 751
P.2d 122, 127 (1988)).
349. Id. at 7 (quoting from 6 CJ.S. Arbitration § 154, 410-12)).
350. Id. at 8-9.
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mistake of law is of such a nature as to be manifestly unjust and therefore require
vacating.35
D. Validity of Award
Air Conditioning Equipment, Inc. v. Rogers35 2 involved a non-final order
entered by the original arbitrator, subsequent disqualification of the arbitrator, and
eventual removal of the matter from arbitration by the court. The court concluded
that the interim ruling should not have been confirmed as an "award."
33
An arbitration award should resolve and determine all matters that have been
submitted,3 and generally, a confirmation of an "award" that is not final is
considered invalid. 5 However, an incomplete award may be confirmed where
the omitted matters are severable and sufficiently independent of the matters
determined in the order. 5 6 In Air Conditioning Equipment, the arbitrator's order
left unresolved "numerous interrelated issues, and did not contain within its terms
an objective formula for adequately disposing of them."357 The court additional-
ly found that the trial court had no authority to remove the matter from arbitration
regardless of its frustration with the lack of progress.'58 A successor arbitrator
should have been appointed. The court ordered appointment of such an arbitrator
and commencement of arbitration de novo due to the uncertainty of the interim
order.359
In Goeller v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,36° a panel of three arbitrators
assembled as provided in an insurance policy contract. The neutral arbitrator
issued an order signed only by the neutral arbitrator, and the arbitrator appointed
by Goeller maintained that he had not been consulted and that the order
misrepresented his opinion. 6 Liberty Mutual then filed a petition to confirm
the award.6 2  Because all the panel members had not participated in the
351. See Raugh, 201 Ill. App. 3d at 367, 559 N.E.2d at 77. That court held that an "arbitrator's
mistakes of fact and errors in application of the law cannot be excused because they are apparent on
the face of the award," and therefore the award is invalid and must by vacated. Id.
352. 551 So. 2d 554 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
353. Id. at 556.
354. See Hearst Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 584 A;2d 655, 658 (Me. 1991) (the court held that
an award must meet a standard of "clear and definiteness" to be enforceable; a court can not confirm
or enter judgment on an award which is incomplete).
355. Air Conditioning Equipment, 551 So. 2d at 556.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. ]d. at 557.
359. Id.
360. 568 A.2d 176 (Pa. 1990).
361. Id. at 177.
362. Id.
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deliberations, the trial court refused to confirm the award as it was found not to
be a final award.-3 A new panel was ordered to try the case.
23 4
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the purported award failed
to meet the statutory requirement that the "award of the arbitrators shall be in
writing and signed by the arbitrators joining in the award," and thus the award was
a nullity.m The court reasoned that when an arbitrator "properly appointed and
entitled to act, is denied access to the deliberations of the other arbitrators, their
decision is not a decision."3 6 While a strong presumption exists "in favor of an
arbitration panel's final award," it must be the result of corporate actions of the
panel. 7 Hence, the award should not be confirmed, and a new arbitration panel
was properly ordered to try the case. 3"
E. Collateral Proceedings
According to Florida's U.A.A. sections 682.12-14, a trial court has four
options when faced with an arbitration award: (1) it can confirm the award, (2)
vacate the award, (3) modify the award, or (4) correct the award.3 9 In Carpet
Concepts v. Architectural ConceptsY" pursuant to AAA Commercial Arbitration
Rule B, the arbitrator prohibited the filing of a new or different claim after the
arbitrator had been appointed.7 Subsequent to the appointment of the
arbitrator, Architectural Concepts served a counterclaim that had not been
discussed at the preliminary hearing.37 2 The arbitrator dismissed the counter-
claim without prejudice.373 Thereafter, Carpet Concepts filed an application for
confirmation and within ninety days Architectural Concepts filed a motion to refer
the application to arbitration.37 The trial court granted the motion and referred
the matter back to arbitration.
375
The District Court of Appeals found that Carpet Concepts was entitled to
confirmation because Architectural Concepts failed to establish one of the limited
grounds upon which the award could be vacated, e.g. the award was modified or
corrected.3 6 The court went on to conclude that even if Architectural Concept's




366. Id. at 178.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. FLA. STAT. § 682.12-14 (1987).
370. 559 So. 2d 303 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
371. Id. at 304-05.
372. Id. at 304.
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evidence material to the controversy ... as to prejudice substantially the rights of
a party", Architectural Concepts failed to demonstrate the requisite prejudice.37
The court could not find prejudice, as Architectural Concept's counterclaim was




F. Vacation Based on Nonstatutory Grounds
The standard of review for arbitration awards is limited, and in Illinois an
arbitration award must be enforced if the arbitrator acts within his scope of
authority and the award draws its essence from the parties' collective bargaining
agreement.3 " However, if the award violates public policy it will not be
enforced. 3 Furthermore, courts refuse to enforce arbitration awards that require
violations of laws."s This sentiment was echoed in AFSCME v. Department of
Corrections.m The court in AFSCME supported the trial court's vacation of an
arbitration award where the arbitrator applied the exclusionary rule outside the
realm of criminal law, a misapplication violative of public policy.
383
Similarly, in Department of Central Management Services v. AFSCME, 3
the court concluded that where an arbitration award arises from a collective
bargaining agreement that violates public policy, the reviewing court has the power
to vacate the award. In that case, the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Act)
governed the parties' collective bargaining agreement, which contained a provision
allowing the parties to submit employee discharges to arbitration. 3s5 The Act
provided that the arbitration provisions of collective bargaining agreements are
subject to the Illinois U.A.A. 3  Accordingly, section 12(a) of the U.A.A.
allowed for circuit court vacation of arbitration awards under certain circumstanc-
es. 387 This section also provided that, with respect to vacating, modifying, or
correcting awards entered as a result of arbitration provisions in collective
bargaining agreements, the grounds for vacating, modifying, or correcting shall be
those "which existed prior to the enactment of this Act."'  In fact, public policy
was grounds for vacation of an arbitration award that existed at common law prior
to the enactment of the U.A.A 389
377. 1d.
378. 1d.
379. See AFSCME v. State, 124 Il. 2d 246, 253-55, 529 N.E.2d 534, 537 (1988).
380. ld. at 260, 529 N.E.2d at 540.
381. Id. at 263, 529 N.E.2d at 541.
382. 192 Ill. App. 3d 108, 548 N.E.2d 592 (1989).
383. Id. at 110, 548 N.E.2d at 594-95.
384. 554 N.E.2d 759 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).




389. Id. at 762.
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The court concluded that "section 8 of the Act makes the UAA applicable for
review of the instant arbitrators' awards. '090 "As the award arises from
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, section 12(e) of the UAA makes
the common law grounds for vacation of awards the test we must apply, and a
violation of public policy is one of those grounds."
3 91
This conclusion settled the dispute as to whether the Illinois State Labor
Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to arbitration awards
issued under collective bargaining agreements where the challenge to the award
is violative of public policy; the court concluded that the trial court, in reviewing
the award, has the power to vacate on the grounds of public policy.
392
VI. MODIFICATION OR CORRECTION OF AWARDS
Pursuant to section 9 of the U.A.A.,393 the arbitrator(s) may modify or
correct a faulty arbitration award. Likewise, pursuant to section 13'" of the
UA.A., the court may modify or correct an arbitration award. Because the
arbitration process is to remain an effective alternative to judicial resolution, the
grounds for modification or correction are limited. The award may be modified
or corrected only upon a finding of evident miscalculation, evident mistake in
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. It at 762-63.
393. Section 9 of the UA.A. concerns the change of award by arbitrators and provides:
On application of a party or, if an application to the court is pending under Sections
11, 12 or 13, on submission to the arbitrators by the court under such conditions as the
court may order, the arbitrators may modify or correct the award upon the grounds stated
in paragraphs (1) and (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 13, or for the purpose of clarifying
the award. The application shall be made within twenty days after delivery of the award
to the applicant. Written notice thereof shall be given forthwith to the opposing party,
stating he must serve his objections thereto, if any, within ten days from the notice. The
award so modified or corrected is subject to the provisions of Sections 11, 12 and 13.
UA.A. § 9.
394. The U.A.A section concerning modification or correction of awards provides:
(a) Upon application made within ninety days after delivery of a copy of the award
to the applicant, the court shall modify or correct the award where:
(1) There was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in
the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award;
(2) The arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them and
the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the issues
submitted; or
(3) The award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of
the controversy.
(b) If the application is granted, the court shall modify and correct the award as
so to effect its intent and shall confirm the award as so modified and corrected.
Otherwise, the court shall confirm the award as made.
(c) An application to modify or correct an award may be joined in the alternative
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description, a matter not properly submitted, imperfect form of award, or where
clarification of the award is necessary.39s
In Kersting v. Royal-Milbank Insurance,396 arbitrators concluded that the
collateral source rule was inapplicable to arbitration proceeding and did not act to
reduce the arbitrator's award. 97 The Minnesota collateral source rule provides
that in a civil action a party may file a motion to determine collateral sources and
the trial court shall reduce the award by that amount. 398 The court of appeals
concluded that arbitration is not an "action" within the meaning of the collateral
source statute.399 Accordingly, the language of the statute cannot require its
application in arbitration proceedings.400
The court went on to state that even if it had accepted the argument that the
collateral source statute applied to arbitration proceedings, the court would still
"disagree as to the duty of the trial court to correct the arbitration panel's error in
not applying the statute." 4° ' The court stated that the grounds for "vacating or
modifying an arbitration award are specific and narrow." 2 Additionally, the
court cited previous cases holding that "a court will not ever set aside an
arbitration award because it thinks the arbitrators erred as to the law or facts, as
long as the reasoning and judgment are consistent."" The court also cited
precedent holding "no statutory or case law-authority exists giving the district
court jurisdiction to vacate an award because the arbitrator(s) made an error of
law."' The court concluded that under existing case law the court did not have
jurisdiction to modify the arbitration award.405
VII. TIMELINESS
Motions to vacate must be made "within ninety days after delivery of a copy
of the award to the applicant, except that, if predicated upon corruption, fraud or
other undue means, it shall be made within ninety days after such grounds are
known or should have been known."406 A motion to modify or correct must also
be made within ninety days measured from the delivery date of a copy of the
award to the applicant." 7 Courts will follow time requirements strictly either
395. Id.
396. 456 N.W.2d 270 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
397. Id. at 274.
398. Id. at 272.
399. d. at 274.
400. d. at 273-74.
401. Id. at 274.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 274 (quoting Johnson v. American Family Mut. Ins., 426 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Minn.
1988)).
404. Id. (quoting Lucas v. American Family Mut. Ins., 403 N.W.2d 646, 649 (Minn. 1987)).
405. Id.
406. UAA § 12(b) (Vacating an award).
407. U.A.A. § 13(a) (Modification or correction of an award).
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adhering to the ninety day requirement of the U.A.A. or the time requirement of
the state's version of the U.A.A. 
A. Motions to Vacate, Motions to Modify or Correct, and Appeals
In Local 2, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, v. Anderson
Underground Construction, Inc.,409 a joint labor-management committee
conducted an arbitration hearing of a grievance asserting violation of the parties'
collective bargaining agreement."" The committee issued the arbitration award,
a finding against Anderson, without signatures.411 Anderson received a copy of
the award on February 14, 1986.412 Anderson never questioned the finality of
the committee's award until the committee recirculated the award after making
minor calculation corrections.413 This modified award was signed on July 2,
1986.4'4 Anderson asserted grounds to vacate for the first time on April 3,
1987.415 The district court adopted the provision of the Missouri U.A.A. which
requires final application to vacate an award to be filed "within 90 days after
delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant."41 6 Accordingly, the court of
appeals refused to hear the motion to vacate as it was time-barred. 41 7
While the copy of the award did not have signatures, the court concluded that
the "record shows the parties understood the final award was circulated in
February and, indeed, Anderson acknowledged 'the complete award was read..
. and summarily approved'" at the February meeting.418 Additionally, the court
found that the committee's "ministerial activity of correcting a minor computation-
al error did not alter the essential elements of the February award's finality." 419
B. Actions to Confirm or Enforce
The Minnesota Court of Appeals in Hanson v. Larson420 dealt with an
arbitration action involving interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement
subject to federal labor law under the Labor Management Relations Act. The
court, in considering what statue of limitations to apply to determine timeliness,
408. See Local 2, Int'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers v. Anderson Underground Constr., Inc. 907
F.2d 74, 75-76 (8th Cir. 1990).
409. 907 F.2d 74.






416. Id (quoting Mo. REv. STAT. § 435.405(2) (1986)).
417. Id. at 76.
418. Md
419. Id.
420. 459 N.W.2d 339 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
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referred to the Minnesota Supreme Court's conclusion that "an action in district
court to compel arbitration is an action 'upon a contract' subject to the six-year
limitation period."42 The court found no reason to distinguish between actions
to compel and actions to enforce with respect to limitation periods."' The court
concluded that the action brought to enforce the award, brought less than six years
after the award upon employer's breach of the collective bargaining agreement,
was not time-barred by the applicable statues of limitations.'
VIII. JUDGMENTS ON AWARDS
Attorney's fees may not be made a part of an arbitrator's award even if the
arbitration agreement expressly provides for such payment.424 Some state
versions of the U.A.A. also expressly prohibit awarding attorney fees in a final
award.425 The general rational behind such prohibition is that arbitrator's are
frequently unqualified to determine reasonable attorney fees.
26
The Florida Arbitration Code prohibits awarding attorney's fees for services
rendered by the attorney during arbitration.42  Section 682.11 provides that
unless otherwise provided, the arbitrator's expenses and other expenses shall be
paid in the award, "not including counsel fees."428 Previous Florida cases hold
that, "[a]ttorney's fees for arbitration proceedings are expressly excluded by
section 682.11, Florida Statutes (1985).429
In Fewox v. McMerit Construction Co.,4 30 the Florida Court of Appeals
retreated from this previous blanket denial of attorney's fees in concluding that
"the 'not including counsel fees' clause in section 682.11 merely indicates that an
arbitrator may not include attorney's fees in his award of expenses and fees
incurred during arbitration proceedings."431  The court discussed the original
purpose in excluding attorney's fees from the subject matter jurisdiction of
arbitration, reasoning that arbitrators are generally businessmen and are chosen
because of expertise in particular areas, and as such, have no expertise for
analyzing a attorney's reasonable fee.432 The Fewox court concluded that "the
intent of the statue is merely to prohibit arbitrators from awarding attorney's fees,"
and that "[t]he proper place to determine the entitlement to and amount of
421. Id. at 341.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 342-43.
424. U.AA. § 10 (fees and expenses of arbitration).
425. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 682.11 (1990).
426. See Fewox v. McMerit Constr. Co., 556 So. 2d 419, 421-22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
427. FLA. STAT. § 682.11.
428. Id.
429. Glen Johnson, Inc. v. L.M. Howdeshell, Inc., 520 So. 2d 297, 298 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988);
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Sample, 533 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1988).
430. 556 So. 2d 419.
431. Id. at 421.
432. Id. at 421-22.
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attorney's fees.., is in the circuit court upon application for the confirmation of
the [arbitrator's] award." 433
Fewox involved seemingly conflicting statutes. Sections 627.428 and 627.756
allowed an award of attorney's fees against a surety insurer under a performance
bond. 4 Section 682.11, on the other hand, prohibited attorney's fees in an
arbitration award.4 35 The court in Fewox ultimately concluded that "sections
627.428 and 627.756 authorize an award of attorney's fees to appellants,
notwithstanding section 682.11, which merely prohibits the arbitrator from making
such an award."4 '5
The court in Raymond James & Associates, Inc. v. Wieneke430 7 reiterated
this philosophy regarding attorney's fees. The Wieneke court concluded that it
was improper for arbitrators to include attorney's fees within their award.438
The court stated that when the trial court reconsiders the petition for attorney's
fees, "if there exists a contract or statute which allows the parties to be awarded
fees on the underlying lawsuit, the trial judge may then award fees."439
IX. JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction under the U.A.A. is provided for by section 17. This section
states that the making of a valid arbitration agreement under section 1 of the
U.A.A. "providing for arbitration in this State confers jurisdiction on the court to
enforce the agreement under this act and to enter judgment on an award
thereunder."" 0  Jurisdictional problems usually arise when an arbitration
agreement does not specifically provide for arbitration in a named state.
In Dewitt v. Al-Haddad,"4 the appellate court held that the Tennessee
UA.A. confers jurisdiction on Tennessee courts if an agreement for arbitration
could result in arbitration in Tennessee." 2 Relying upon the reasoning set forth
in L.R. Foy Construction Co. v. Dean L. Dauley and Waldorf Associates," 3 the
appellate court found that as long as the requirements of in personam jurisdiction
are met, then an agreement to be bound by a process that could result in
Tennessee as the site of arbitration confers jurisdiction on Tennessee courts to
confirm arbitration awards.4" The court also used this requirement of personal
433. Id. at 422.
434. FLA. STAT. §§ 627.428(1), 627.756 (1990).
435. Id. § 682.11.
436. Fewox, 556 So. 2d at 425; see also Park Shore Dev. Co. v. Higley South, Inc., 556 So. 2d
439, 439-40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
437. 556 So. 2d 800 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
438. Id.
439. Id. at 801.
440. UA.A. § 17.
441. No. 89-394-I (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 1990) (WESTLAW, TN-CS database).
442. Id. at 2-3.
443. 547 F. Supp. 166 (D. Kan. 1982).
444. Dewitt, No. 89-394-Il, slip op. at 3.
1991]
37
Blair et al.: Blair: Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
jurisdiction to refute the defendant's claim that an extremely expansive interpreta-
tion of the Tennessee U.A.A. "would in effect confer upon Tennessee courts
jurisdictional power to enforce virtually any contract anywhere in the country
providing for arbitration."" 5
In H.T.L Corp. v. Lida Manufacturing Co.,4"6 the Missouri Court of
Appeals held that jurisdiction was to be decided by the contract itself regardless
of the contract's validity. 47 H.T.L involved a contractual dispute over a contract
that called for arbitration and specified that the contract would be governed by the
laws of New York.4" When H.T.I. asked a Missouri court to issue an order to
stay the arbitration proceedings, the trial court dismissed for lack of jurisdic-
tion.449 On appeal, H.T.I. argued that although Missouri might be the improper
forum for arbitration, the contract did not deprive the Missouri court of the
jurisdiction to decide whether the arbitration clause existed in the first place.450
The appellate court found that cases concerning the confirmation of an arbitration
award were instructive.45' These cases have held that jurisdiction to confirm
an award arises out of a Missouri statute which is verbatim to section 17 of the
U.A.A. 452 This section bestows jurisdiction only when the agreement provides
for "arbitration in this state".4s 3 Therefore, the court went on to hold that "since
Missouri is not the state in which arbitration is specified, Missouri is without
jurisdiction to proceed."454
X. APPEALS
The U.A.A. authorizes appeals to be taken from:
(1) An order denying an application to compel arbitration made under Section
2; (2) An order granting an application to stay arbitration made under Section
2(b); (3) An order confirming or denying confirmation of award; (4) An
order modifying or correcting an award; (5) An order vacating an award
without directing a rehearing; or (6) A judgment or decree entered pursuant
to the provisions of this act.
455
445. Id.
446. 785 S.W.2d 110 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
447. Id. at 111.
448. Id.
449. d.
450. Id. at 112.
451. Id.; see State ex reL Tri-City Constr. Co. v. Marsh, 668 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984).
452. H.T.L Corp., 785 S.W.2d at 112; see Mo. REv. STAT. § 435.430 (1980).
453. H.T.L Corp., 785 S.W.2d at 112 (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.430).
454. Id. at 113.
455. U.A.A. § 19.
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In addition, the Act allows appeals to be taken "in the same manner and to the
same extent as from orders or judgments in a civil action."456 Because courts
grant deference to an arbitrator's decision, courts generally are not willing to
accommodate parties desiring to appeal.
A. Appeals Same as Civil Actions
As the U.A.A. provides, appeals are allowed to be taken in the same manner
as civil cases.4 5 7 In most civil cases, one may only appeal final orders. In Ector
v. Motorists Insurance Cos.,4ss the Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed that an
order compelling arbitration is interlocutory and not appealable as a matter of
right.45 9 But pursuant to Pennsylvania statute title 42 section 7320(a)(1), the
court held that since the appellant was only appealing the trial court's denial of
summary judgment and the grant of the appellee's summary judgment motion, the
appeal was not an order compelling arbitration.'3 An appeal of a court's denial
or grant of summary judgment motions is clearly appealable in civil actions and
therefore appealable under the U.A.A."'
In Saltzman Printers, Inc. v. Gunthrop-Warren Printing Co.,46 2 an Illinois
appellate court denied an appeal because parties did not comply with statutory
prerequisites. 3  In Saltzman, the court had to decide if an order granting
summary judgment in favor of Gunthrop-Warren was appealable as a final
order. 464 The parties also presented multiple issues for the court to decide.'3
According to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a), in the absence of a special
finding that there is no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal, "any judgment
that adjudicates fewer than all parties is not enforceable or appealable."' 6
Because the parties failed to request a special finding in accordance with the rule,
the Illinois court refused to allow an appeal." 7
456. Id.
457. d.
458. 391 Pa. Super. 458,571 A.2d 457 (1990), appeal denied, 525 Pa. 646,581 A.2d 572 (1990),
appeal denied, 575 Pa. 647, 581 A.2d 573 (1990).
459. Id. at 461, 571 A.2d at 459,
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. 192 I1. App. 3d 130, 548 N.E.2d 585 (1989).
463. Id. at 133, 548 N.E.2d at 587.
464. Id. at 131, 548 N.E.2d at 586.
465. Id.
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B. UAA Authorized Appeals
The U.A.A. authorizes appeals in several circumstances.40 In Valley
Construction Co. v. Perry Host Management Co.,' the Kentucky Supreme
Court allowed an appeal to be taken under Kentucky's version of the U.A.A. 470
In a dispute between a hotel developer and contractor, the developer sued for
breach of contract, breach of warranties and negligence47t When the contractor
moved to stay proceedings and to compel arbitration the lower court denied both
motions.472 The Kentucky Supreme Court allowed an appeal on the grounds that
although the motion lacked language of finality, the U.A.A. specifically allows
appeals from a denial to stay and appeal from a motion to compel arbitration.473
A somewhat different result occurred under the Maryland U.A.A. in Regina
Construction Corp. v. Envirmech Contracting Corp.4 In Regina, a subcontrac-
tor sued a general contractor arguing that their dispute was not covered by the
arbitration clause in the parties' contract.475 But the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals decided that the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to dismiss
was functionally equivalent to an order denying a motion to compel arbitration,
which is specifically authorized under Maryland's version of the U.A.A.
476
In National Avenue Building v. Stewart, 7 a property owner and an
excavation contractor arbitrated a dispute.478 When the property owner filed a
motion for the court to reconsider various prior orders, the circuit court granted
the motion and entered an order purporting to stay arbitration.479 The Missouri
468. U.AA. § 1
469. 796 S.W.2
470. Id.












80 Md. App. 662, 565 A.2d 693 (Q. Spec. App. 1989).
d. at 664, 565 A.2d at 694.
Id. at 672, 565 A.2d at 698.
794 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. C1. App. 1990).
Id. at 304-05.
Id. at 307.
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Court of Appeals disallowed the contractor's appeal.4 0 The court articulated
two grounds for its decision. First, the order to stay arbitration was not appealable
when the order was entered 19 months after completion of arbitration, because at
that time there was neither threat of arbitration nor pending arbitration.4
1
Second, the appeal was disallowed as an order vacating an existing award. 4 2
The trial court has neither "confirmed, vacated, modified, or corrected the







480. Id. at 309.
481. Id. at 308.
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